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The Regression Tournament:  












Standard methods to assess the statistical quality of econometric models implicitly assume there is 
only one person in the world, namely the forecaster with her model(s), and that there exists an 
objective and independent reality to which the model predictions may be compared. However, on 
many occasions, the reality with which we compare our predictions and in which we take our actions 
is co-determined and changed constantly by actions taken by other actors based on their own 
models. We propose a new method, called a regression tournament, to assess the utility of 
forecasting models and taking these interactions into account. We present an empirical case of 
betting on Australian Rules Football matches where the most accurate predictive model does not 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we propose a novel way to assess the relative quality of econometric models. We 
demonstrate empirically that the models with higher predictive accuracy, as measured by goodness 
of fit statistics, are not necessarily those that provide the most useful guidance for real life decisions. 
There is a need for an alternative assessment method that takes into account the usefulness of 
models for making real-life choices.  
 
The basic idea comes from gambling studies. In a gambling setting, such as betting on a horse race or 
football match winners, what matters is not the goodness of fit of your predictive model per se, but 
rather the return it gives you when used for making bets at the odds set by a bookmaker. That is, the 
utility of your model is not assessed by comparing it to the real world outcomes (i.e. the actual match 
winners), but rather by interacting it with reality as perceived by your bookmaker and expressed by 
the odds offered to you. 
 
Schnytzer (2010) has shown empirically that the two assessment criteria – the traditional “goodness 
of fit” and the gambling return made by betting on your regressions – do not always choose the same 
model as the best one. He developed a set of models to predict winners of Australian Rules Football 
matches, and simulated the returns one would achieve by using the model predictions to bet at an 
internet sport betting site, taking the last available fixed odds offered. The surprising result was that 
the model which would give him the highest betting return was not the one that had the highest 
goodness of fit in purely statistical terms. 
 
In the following, we develop a simple taxonomy of forecasting to see clearly the issues involved, and 
then propose a method to assess the quality of econometric models by interacting them with each 
other, rather than just simply comparing each one separately with real world outcomes. We also 
provide an empirical illustration of the proposed method in a betting context. 
 
2.  Assessing predictions: statistical quality vs. utility of models 
 
There are in general two ways of assessing quality of regression models. One is to use the model to 
estimate (or predict) values of the dependent variable and then compare these estimates to the 
actual real world values. The comparison is made by calculating some forecast accuracy measures, 3 
 
such as mean standard error or goodness of fit statistics.
3 This is a standard procedure; henceforth 
we refer to it as assessing the “statistical quality” of a model. 
 
The other way is to take some action based on your regression model and then evaluate whether 
your action has achieved intended results. Betting on football matches is one example. Trading in 
financial markets based on your predictions of stock movements is another. An example from the 
public choice domain is fine-tuning a country’s budget to the most recent macroeconomic forecast. 
In all these cases, what matters is not the accuracy of the model itself, but the utility one gets by 
acting on model predictions. We call this procedure assessing the “utility” of a model. 
 
It is usually taken for granted that there is a positive correlation between the statistical quality of 
models and their utility, i.e. that the more accurate model would also prove more useful if used for 
real-life decisions. But it is not straightforward to validate this assumption, and, as we show in this 
paper, it may actually be false.   
 
In a real world setting, such as trading stocks or betting on sports, at least some of the actors will 
produce their own private forecasts that will not be publicly available and hence not observable to an 
outsider. Now assume we find that actor B achieves higher market returns than does actor A. This 
superior performance may be due to B having a more accurate forecasting model, or to B having a 
better ability to respond to a given forecast in a profitable manner, or both.  As outside observers, 
we cannot tell which is the case, because we cannot assess the statistical quality of actors’ private 
forecasting models. We can only apply the “utility assessment”; that is, we may compare 
performance (outcomes, profits) of competing actors, but we can’t tell whether variation in 
performance comes from variation in forecasts or from variation in actions taken in response to 
forecasts. 
 
There are two special cases to this general logic. One is a situation with no private models; that is, all 
decision-makers base their separate actions on the same set of publicly available forecasts. As an 
example, one can think of a set of publicly available macroeconomic forecasts and a number of 
economic agents (enterprises, investors, consumers, etc.) taking separate and diverging actions 
achieving different results. Or think of publicly known predictions of oil-reserves depletion and 
actions, if any, by actors that would probably be affected. Or think simply of a public weather 
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forecast and people deciding whether to carry an umbrella or not.  In such a situation when all 
forecasts are public, the variation in results (real-world returns of individual actors) must come from 
variation in responses to these forecasts. In this case then, the “utility assessment” strictly compares 
only the ability of decision-makers to act on the given publicly available information.
4  
 
The other special case is when actors have different private forecasting models, but all use the same 
decision rules for acting on their divergent forecasts. In such a situation, we would be safe to say that 
all variations in returns come from variations in the statistical quality of individual models, and not 
from differences in individual actions. In this case of homogenous responses to predictions, we could 
use the observable differences in returns as an (alternative) measure of statistical quality of the 
underlying models.  
 
In reality, it is of course not possible to expect all individuals to follow the same decision rule. But it 
can be done on paper. This is what Schnytzer (2010) did in the above mentioned article. He applied 
the same betting rule to winning probabilities calculated using different forecasting models. Using 
the same rule for action, one would naturally expect that any differences in performance (betting 
returns) would strictly reflect differences in the statistical quality of forecasting models. However, 
and this is quite puzzling, the statistically superior model did not produce the highest profit. In this 
paper, we further explore this puzzling finding. 
 
3.  The puzzle 
 
In Schnytzer (2010), forecasts produced by different models were used to simulate betting at the 
actual odds set by real-life bookmakers. In this way, the models were indirectly compared to each 
other by interacting their winning predictions with the odds set by the unknown bookmaker’s model. 
An obvious shortcoming of such procedure is that the model used to set the odds against which the 
simulated bets were waged was not observable. That is, we know the odds, but not the model 
(statistical or intuitive) used by the bookie to estimate winning probabilities and transform them into 
betting odds.  
 
In this paper, we try to generalize the idea of testing the quality of models by interacting them to 
each other, without the need to have a third party (a bookie) offering odds independently. For an 
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empirical illustration, we take the same models as used by Schnytzer (2010) to estimate the winning 
probabilities for Australian Rules Football matches. However, instead of using the actual odds put 
forward by the bookmakers, we take one of our own models to play the role of the bookie.  
 
We use two types of models to estimate winning probabilities of Australian Football league matches: 
a linear probability model (LPM) and a conditional logit model (CLOG) (McFadden 1974). Four 
different specifications were used with each model. The first one (LPM1 and CLOG1) uses only 
player-level variables. The second pair of regressions (LPM2 and CLOG2) add two dummy variables, 
the first indicating whether or not the home team has an a priori home ground advantage and the 
second indicating whether or not the stadium in which the current game is being played is a neutral 
ground, offering no a priori advantage to either side.
5 Regressions LPM 3 and CLOG3 add to the 
extant explanatory variables two team-level dummy variables which indicate whether or not the 
team has clinched a place in the finals or whether the team has definitely been eliminated from the 
finals race immediately prior to the game to be played, respectively. Finally, regressions LPM 4 and 
CLOG4 add a further team-level variable which measures the proportion of wins accumulated by the 
team so far in the current season prior to the current game. 
 
For purposes of prediction, the regressions are run on the data subset containing all observations 
from the first round of 1998 through the 2000 Grand Final. These regressions are used to predict the 
winning probabilities of the teams in round 1 of 2001 by substituting the mean values of the player-
level explanatory variables for the 1998-2000 period into the obtained regression results. For each 
player in the team, each regression predicts a probability which may be interpreted as that player’s 
predicted contribution to the team’s winning probability. In the case of the conditional logit 
regressions, these probabilities sum to 1 for each game. Thus, summing them across players in any 
given team yields the predicted winning probability for that team. The linear probability model 
requires an extra step since probabilities do not generally sum to 1 for each game.
6 Accordingly, 
these predictions are normalized over each game and the resultant sums per team taken as the 
predicted winning probabilities for the relevant team.  
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The models are now re-estimated adding round one of 2001 data and used to predict winners in 
round two of 2001. This procedure is repeated for all rounds in all seasons up to the 2007 Grand 
Final. The simulated betting is on those teams for which the predicted winning probability exceeds 
0.5 (i.e. the predicted favorites in the game) and the amount bet is in proportion to the predicted 




Before introducing the notion of a regression tournament, we reproduce the essential results from 
Schnytzer (2000). Table 1 provides the basic goodness of fit statistics for the 8 model specifications, 
and the simulated average annual rates of return achieved by using the respective models for 
betting. Since returns in the first three years of simulation (2001-2004) were negative for all models, 
we calculate average returns also for the sub-period 2004-2007.  
 
Table 1: Goodness of fit and betting returns 




0.0180  0.0477  0.0581  0.0821  0.0147  0.0371  0.0530  0.0852 





-0.1767  -0.0350  -0.0030  -0.0096  -0.1414  -0.0347  -0.0154  -0.0430 





-0.1687  0.0139  0.0395  0.0113  -0.1337  0.0123  0.0214  -0.0236 
Rank  8  3  1  5  7  4  2  6 
Source: adapted from Schnytzer (2000). Notes: * Ranks reported among models of the same 
regression type (LPM, CLOG), as goodness of fit statistics are not directly comparable. ** For the 
relevant regression run on the entire data set. 
 
 
The table clearly demonstrates the puzzle. Among the LPM models, LPM4 is the best in statistical 
terms, but betting with the help of LPM3 or even LPM2 would clearly yield higher returns. Similarly, 
specification no. 4 is statistically the most accurate one among CLOG models, but CLOG3 and CLOG2 
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clearly outperform it in terms of betting returns. The highest returns overall are realized by LPM3. 
Second place goes to LPM2 or, for the sub-period, to CLOG2.  
 
There are two problems with interpreting the results in table 1. First, the goodness of fit statistics for 
LPM and CLOG regressions may not be directly compared. Second, the differences between the 
statistical quality and the real-life betting utility of models may depend on the specifics of their 
interactions with the model (explicit or implicit) used by the bookmaker to set the odds, which of 
course is unobservable to us. To circumvent these problems, we now proceed to what we call a 
regression tournament. This procedure allows us to compare the relative utility of our models 
without having to use the odds set by an exogenous bookmaker, and without computing any 
goodness of fit statistics. 
 
4.  A regression tournament  
 
The idea is simple. We use our models for betting not against the odds set exogenously, but against 
the odds set by one of our other models. The odds are set for each match according to the predicted 
winning probabilities of the two teams. When converting the probabilities into bookmakers’ prices, 
an “over-round” is added that corresponded to that used by actual bookmakers. For example, if the 
sum of the bookies’ odds (expressed as prices) for a given match was 1.03, the predicted probabilities 
from our model were multiplied by 1.03.  
 
The procedure for assessing the quality of our models is now the following. We use one of the 
models, e.g. LPM1, as our bookmaking model and set the odds for each game played since the first 
round of 2001. Then we use all other models to wage bets, according to winning probabilities 
estimated by each model, and calculate the betting return that would be made by using each model 
separately over the entire 2001 to 2007 period. Once this calculation is completed, we take another 
model (LPM2) to act as a bookie, and again use all other models to wage bets and calculate profits. 
We repeat the procedure until all models have taken the role of a bookie. To facilitate a fair 
comparison of models, the regressions were run over the identical sample of matches with no data 
missing. This required eliminating round one and the finals matches from each season in the forecast 
period (2001-2007).  
 
In this way, we use the same decision rule with all betting models and hence, as explained in Section 
2, the differences in betting returns should reflect only the differences in statistical quality of the 
models. On the hypothesis of correspondence between statistical quality and utility of models, we 8 
 
would expect the models with better goodness of fit (of their predictions) to yield higher returns 
when used for betting. However, as results of our exercise in Table 2 demonstrate, this is clearly not 
the case. This means that our method – a regression tournament – provides an alternative way of 
assessing models' quality that does not necessarily give same results as traditional methods. 
 
Table 2 
Rates of return* made by models betting at the odds set by the bookmaking model 
  Betting (predicting) model 
Bookmaking 
model 
LPM1  LPM2  LPM3  LPM4  CL1  CL2  CL3  CL4 
LPM1     0.0327  0.0262  0.0027    0  0.0324  -0.0103  -0.0652 
LPM2  -0.1329     -0.0406  -0.0400  -0.1190  0.0324  -0.0103  -0.0652 
LPM3  -0.1265  -0.0027     -0.0443  -0.1149  0.0319  -0.0103  -0.0652 
LPM4  -0.0668  0.1518  0.1625     -0.0397  0.0353  -0.0107  -0.0652 
CL1   0  0.0327  0.0291  -0.0060     0.0324  -0.0103  -0.0652 
CL2  -0.1329   0  -0.0718  -0.0671  -0.1190     -0.0593  -0.0652 
CL3  -0.1039  0.0116  0.2024  -0.6200  -0.0897  -0.0264     -0.0710 
CL4  -0.0522  0.1043  0.1176  0.1768  -0.0250  0.0958  0.0842    
Negative 
returns 
6  1  2  5  6  1  6  7 
Positive 
returns 
0  5  5  2  0  6  1  0 




2 **  
0.0187  0.0530  0.0689  0.0920  0.0155  0.0414  0.0643  0.0945 
Notes: * A zero indicates that the odds set by the bookmaking model were always too low to bet, so no bets 
were made.  ** For the relevant regression run on the entire data set. The figures differ slightly from the ones 
in table 1 due to some omitted matches as explained in the text.  
 
Among the LPM models, specifications 2 and 3 clearly outperform the other two. Betting by help of 
LPM2 or LPM3 yields positive returns when used against odds set by five out of the seven other 
models. They only give negative or zero returns when bet against each other and against CLOG2. If 
we compare returns of LPM2 and LPM3 when used against the same bookmaking model, LPM2 yields 
higher returns when betting against specification 1 and 2 (LPM1, CLOG1, CLOG2), whereas LPM3 is 
better in betting against specification 3 and 4 (CLOG3, LPM4, CLOG4). The statistically superior 
specification LPM4 is clearly inferior for betting purposes, as it yields positive returns only twice. 
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Among the CLOG models, specification 2 stands out clearly. It yields positive returns in all cases 
except when used for betting against CLOG3. All other specifications, including the statistically 
superior CLOG4, yield negative returns in all or almost all cases.  
 
Another advantage of our procedure is that it allows us to compare LPM and CLOG models directly. It 
is not possible to compare their statistical merits (goodness of fit), as one cannot directly compare 
the size of adjusted R
2 (LPM) to pseudo R
2 (CLOG), for example, but our procedure allows us to 
directly compare their utility (in terms of betting returns). In our case, it is interesting to compare the 
best LPM specifications (LPM2 and LPM3) to the best CLOG specification (CLOG2). When compared 
to specifications 1 and 4, there is always one of the LPM specifications that yields the highest return, 
with CLOG2 being ranked in second or third place. This would suggest that LPM models are generally 
more useful for this kind of betting than are CLOG models. However, when CLOG2 is used for betting 
directly against odds set by LPM2 or LPM3, it yields positive returns, while LPM2 and LPM3 produce a 
loss or a zero when used against CLOG2. This prohibits a clear conclusion as to the relative merits of 
LPM and CL models. 
 
Table 3 offers a different look at our results, a sort of a league table for our regressions. Instead of 
counting how many times a model gives a positive return when used for betting, as in Table 2, we 
now look at pair wise comparisons and think of them as matches between two regressions. If the 
return is positive, the betting model wins. If the return is negative, the bookmaking model wins. If 
the return is zero, we declare it a draw (D). Table 2 lists winners of all such matches and counts how 
many times each model emerges as a winner. Now, specification CLOG2 emerges as a tournament 
winner with 12 wins, while LPM2 and LPM3 end up second with 11 points each. Interestingly, LPM4 
and CLOG3 models, with 6 points each, now emerge as better than the rest (LPM1, CL1, CL4), which 




A league table for a regression tournament: winners of games between pairs of regression 
  Betting (predicting) model 
Bookmaking 
model 
LPM1  LPM2  LPM3  LPM4  CL1  CL2  CL3  CL4 
LPM1     LPM2  LPM3  LPM4   D  CL2  LPM1  LPM1 
LPM2  LPM2     LPM2  LPM2  LPM2   CL2  LPM2  LPM2 
LPM3  LPM3  LPM3     LPM3  LPM3  CL2  LPM3   LPM3 
LPM4  LPM4  LPM2  LPM3     LPM4  CL2  LPM4   LPM4 
CL1  D   LPM2  LPM3  CL1     CL2  CL1  CL1 
CL2  CL2   D  CL2  CL2  CL2     CL2  CL2 
CL3  CL3  LPM2   LPM3  CL3  CL3  CL3     CL3 
CL4  CL4  LPM2  LPM3   LPM4  CL4  CL2  CL3    
Number of 
wins   2  11  11  6  3  12  6  2 
 
 
In table 3, each match between two models is treated separately. But since all pairs meet twice 
(interchanging the roles of bookmaking and betting models), it is interesting to establish the 
combined winner of both games. We may have three situations. If the same model wins both 
matches, that is, if it gains a positive return as a bettor and inflicts a negative return on the other 
model when setting the odds, than clearly this model is the combined winner. The second situation is 
when both matches are won by the bookmaking models. In this case, the model which inflicts a 
higher loss on the other one, is the winner. A third possible situation is that both matches are won by 
the betting models, and of course the one that achieves a higher rate of return would be the match 
winner. Interestingly, this situation never appears in our simulations. Note also that when one of the 
two games is a draw, the combined winner is the model that won the other game. 
 
Table 4 present results of the regression tournament when both matches between a pair of models 
are considered together and a combined winner is established. The basic result of table 3, that 
specifications CL2 is the most useful, is not changed. But there are no more shared positions: LPM2 




A league table for a regression tournament: winners of pairs of games between pairs of regression 
  Betting (predicting) model 
Bookmaking 
model 
LPM1  LPM2  LPM3  LPM4  CL1  CL2  CL3  CL4 
LPM1     LPM2  LPM3  LPM4  D   CL2  CL3  LPM1 
LPM2        LPM2  LPM2  LPM2  CL2   LPM2  LPM2 
LPM3           LPM3  LPM3  CL2  LPM3   LPM3 
LPM4              LPM4  CL2  CL3   LPM4 
CL1                 CL2  CL3  CL1 
CL2                    CL2  CL2 
CL3                       CL3 
CL4                         
Number of 
wins   1  6  5  3  1  7  4  0 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes our results. It ranks the predictive models with respect to their simulated rates 
of return when betting against bookmaker's odds, their goodness of fit in predicting the match 
winners, and their performance in all three types of regression tournaments introduced above 
(tables 2 to 4). The problem this table tries to address can be described as follows. Assume you have 
several models available that you could potentially use for betting.  Assume further that you have no 
data available on past odds, so you cannot determine the utility of models by simply simulating 
betting returns for past matches. You are thus left with two options for choosing the best model for 
your purpose: one is to rely on the statistical quality of the models in terms of predicting past match 
results. The other is to run a regression tournament, by which you interact models with each other 
and simulate betting returns that would be achieved if odds were set by your own models. This 
second procedure, proposed in this paper, is closer to what we termed the real-life utility of models. 
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Table 5  
Comparing different methods for choosing the best betting model 











regression tournament in: 
table 2  table 3  table 4 
LPM3  1  1  3.5  2.5  2.5  3 
CLOG3  2  3  3.5  5  4.5  4 
LPM2  3  5  5.5  2.5  2.5  2 
CLOG2  4  4  5.5  1  1  1 
LPM4  5  2  1.5  4  4.5  5 
CLOG4  6  6  1.5  7  7.5  8 
CLOG1  7  7  7.5  7  6  6.5 
LPM1  8  8  7.5  7  7.5  6.5 
Pearson's correlation between ranks: 
for rates of 
return, 
2001-07 
0.83    0.63  0.66  0.64  0.54 
for rates of 
return, 
2004-07 
  0.83  0.39  0.71  0.74  0.71 
Notes: * The model were ranked within their regression type (LPM and CLOG). To ranks were then multiplied 
by 1.5 to make them comparable with other rankings (ie. the first ranked model within the LPM group was 
assigned the rank of 1.5, the second ranked 3.5 etc). This is effectively the same to assuming that the best LPM 
and the best CLOG share the first place, the second bests share third place, etc. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that none of the procedures – calculating statistical goodness of fit or running a 
regression tournament – successfully predicts which of the models will produce the highest betting 
returns. However, there are several indications that the regression tournament may represent a 
useful approach. First, by using the regression tournament winner (CLOG4) one would achieve higher 
returns than by using the goodness of fit favorites (LPM4 or CLOG4).  Secondly, the model that gives 
the highest returns (LPM3) is ranked higher in all tournaments than it is by goodness of fit statistics. 
Finally, for the subperiod 2004-07, the rank correlations with the order of model based on simulated 
rates of return are significantly higher for the regression tournament rankings than for the goodness 




4.  Conclusions 
 
We have presented the idea of a regression tournament as a new procedure for comparative 
assessment of forecasting models. The basic idea is to take several models that forecast the same 
variable, impose the same decision rule on all of them, interact them with each other and then 
compare the relative performance of models in such pair wise interactions.  
 
In our case, the variable forecast was the winning probability in a sports event; the decision rule was 
how to set odds / wage bets according to the estimated probabilities; the performance compared 
was the rate of betting profits made. We explored the empirical case of Australian Rules football, 
where the regression tournament procedure, compared to standard goodness of fit statistics, gave us 
better information on which model would yield higher real-life betting returns.  
 
The main result of our paper is that standard goodness of fit statistic are not appropriate for 
choosing the best model for making real life decisions. Our proposed regression tournament is an 
interesting, although clearly not perfect alternative assessment method. These findings open up a 
vast area for further exploration. Why exactly do statistical properties of models not reveal their real-
life utility? The obvious, but facile answer, that our models suffer from missing variables bias does 
not help because in reality this will always be true to some unknown (and unknowable) extent or 
other. How should regression tournaments be designed to yield useful new information on models' 
usefulness for real life choices? Could a regression tournament be used for comparing regression 
types (i.e. different logit and probit type models for which no comparable goodness of fit statistics 
exist)? Could it be used for more complex predictions, such as predicting the final position for all 
horses competing in a race? 
 
The importance of our findings extends far behind the sports betting contexts. There are many other 
real world examples where the utility of one’s model depends on interaction of his actions with 
actions taken by others according to their own forecasting models. Financial markets are an obvious 
example. It is not only my prediction of stock movements and my strategy that matters; the profits I 
can achieve depend also on actions taken by other traders based on their own models. Another 
example would be trying to protect the real value of my assets against inflation. It is not only my 
inflation expectations and my actions that matter; it is also the expectations and actions of others 
(price setters, governments, central banks etc.) that will interact with my decisions and co-determine 
the final outcome. 
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Standard methods to assess the statistical quality of models neglect such interactions. They implicitly 
assume there is only one person in the world, namely the forecaster with her model(s), and that 
there exists an objective and independent reality to which the model predictions may be compared. 
However, on many occasions, the reality to which we compare our predictions and in which we take 
our actions is codetermined and constantly changed by actions taken by other actors based on their 
own models. We propose that a regression tournament may be an interesting way of taking these 
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